French Idealist philosopher who regarded mathematical judgment as the highest form of human thought.

After cofounding the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (1893) and the Société Française de Philosophie (1901), Brunschvicg became professor of general philosophy in 1909 at the Sorbonne, where he remained (except for the war years, 1914–18) until 1940. In 1919 he was elected to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques and served as its president in 1932.

In his widely acclaimed doctoral thesis, La Modalité du jugement (1897; Sorbonne), Brunschvicg set down his fundamental assertion that knowledge creates the only world we know. He maintained that there can be no philosophy beyond judgment, for judgment is the first activity of the mind and synthesizes the form and content of concepts. Philosophy, therefore, must be a critical appraisal of thought itself, for knowledge can be subjected to reflection only by thought, which provides intelligibility. The spirit's own activity, not concepts, is the principal object of thought.

Brunschvicg's critical Idealism studied the activity of the mind as manifested in the history of mathematics, science, and philosophy, an approach differentiating his method from Kant's deductive one. By contributing to man's progressive self-understanding, science refines man's conscience and thus takes on a moral or spiritual aspect. History, he says, is le progrès de la conscience, meaning both conscience and consciousness. His influence was profound both in France and throughout Europe.