examination of comparative legal systems and of the relationships of the law to the social sciences.

The expression comparative law is a modern one, first used in the 19th century when it became clear that the comparison of legal institutions deserved a systematic approach, in order to increase understanding of foreign cultures and to further legal progress. From early times, however, certain scholars and researchers have made use of the comparative technique, conscious of the advantages to be gained.

In the 6th century BC according to legend, the Greek (Greek law) lawgiver Solon, faced with the task of compiling the laws of Athens, gathered together the laws of various city-states. Similarly, in the 5th century BC, a Roman (Roman law) commission was reported to have consulted the statutes of the Greek communities in Sicily before giving Rome the famous Laws of the Twelve Tables. Aristotle, in the 4th century, is said to have collated the constitutions of no fewer than 158 city-states in his effort to devise a model constitution. Thus, from ancient times it would seem that those wishing to set up a just system have sought inspiration and example from abroad. The true expansion of comparative law, however, was hindered by a number of obstacles—such as the parochialism of social groups, contempt for foreigners, or “barbarians,” and belief in the sacredness or everlasting inviolability of inherited legal rules.

Although certain practices and institutions that crept into Roman law undoubtedly originated in the imperial provinces, Roman legal science took no cognizance of comparative law. Nor can the medieval universities in Europe be said to have displayed great concern for comparative law. Over the centuries, their interest was limited to Roman law, supplemented in certain areas or modified to some extent by canon law. While members of the first school of thought (called glossators) confined themselves to the task of elucidating the meaning of the Roman codes of law, their successors (the postglossators) undertook the systematic arrangement and adaptation of that law to prevailing social conditions. At no time was there an effort to compare laws. The customary laws that one found here and there could hardly hold any interest for scholars labouring to give society a model of ideal justice and to discover or elucidate a higher law above man's making. Indeed, in their opinion, local laws were no more than rubbish and evidently doomed to decay. To compare these local practices would have been a waste of time; to compare them with Roman laws would have been almost indecent.

Such contempt was not characteristic of the attitude of the judges and lawyers whose duty it was to administer justice, mainly by applying the customary law. Their material contained areas of uncertainty and required adaptation to social needs. In the work of ascertaining the content of a custom, and in the task of filling the gaps of customs, judge or lawyer had to consider which customs to allow to prevail. In so doing, he had to decide whether one custom was more just than another and how far he should go in introducing concepts of ideal justice (based on Roman law) that were being promoted by the universities. Two processes were thus at work: the elimination of conflicting local customs and the acceptance and rejection of elements of Roman law. With regard to the first process, the comparative aspects of the work took place behind the scenes, and consequently the results of melding the different local or municipal laws are known, but the reasoning leading to the result is not. With regard to the second process, by contrast, certain publications place the act of comparison in full view. This was particularly noticeable in England, where some writers—such as Sir John Fortescue in the 15th century and Saint-Germain in the 16th—took upon themselves the comparison of common law and Roman law, and in 1623 Sir Francis Bacon (Bacon, Francis, Viscount Saint Alban (or Albans), Baron of Verulam) suggested to James I that a work be drafted comparing English and Scots law, as a preliminary step toward the unification of the two systems.

Despite the occasional use of the comparative technique, nevertheless, comparative law itself was not recognized as a separate branch or as a fundamental technique of legal science until the 19th century. In particular, it played no part in legal education. It was quite unthinkable that the pursuit of justice should be taught by reference to a host of customary rules that were incomplete, sometimes archaic, and generally regarded as barbaric. A foundation of ethical and political principles rather than sociological considerations, an appeal to reason rather than a study of human behaviour or judicial precedent—these were deemed the true criteria of progress.

With the coming of the 19th century, codification of the law (law code) put an end to the dualism existing in many countries between an ideal system, as taught in the universities, and the laws that were applied in everyday practice. Codification of those everyday laws gave them the status of a national law, thoroughly purged of anachronisms and arranged in a systematic manner. That codified law became the cornerstone of legal education. This promotion of local customs, regarded henceforth as being fully consonant with natural justice, may be considered as the underlying cause of the appearance and rise of comparative law.

In short, the attitude toward comparative law tends to change when a country makes its national law the object of legal study and law students begin contrasting it with foreign counterparts. In Europe this dawning change was evident early in the 19th century. Legal periodicals were founded in Germany in 1829 and in France in 1834 to further a systematic study of foreign law. In France, the civil and mercantile laws of modern states were translated with “concordances” referring to the corresponding provisions of the French codes; and in England in 1850–52, Leone Levi published a work entitled Commercial Law, Its Principles and Administration; The Mercantile Law of Great Britain Compared with Roman Law and the Codes or Laws of 59 Other Countries.

A chair of comparative legislation was set up in 1831 in the Collège de France; and this was followed, in 1846, by a chair of comparative criminal law in the University of Paris. In 1869 the Société de Législation Comparée was founded in France, followed in 1873 by the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association. In England, the Society of Comparative Legislation was founded in 1895, and the Quain Professorship of Comparative Law was created at London University in 1894. Similarly, chairs in comparative law were founded and projects in foreign law undertaken all over the continent of Europe, but with particular vigour in France.

The 19th century drew to a close with an important event—the meeting of the First International Congress of Comparative Law in Paris in 1900. Experts from every part of Europe delivered papers and discussed the nature, aims, and general interest of comparative law. Particular emphasis was laid on its role in the preparation of a “common law for the civilized world,” the contents of which would be laid down by international legislation. The stress, however, was on comparative legislation and codification because (with the exception of one English jurist) the congress had attracted only jurists from continental European nations, all of which had coded law, in contrast to English customary, or common, law. Consequently, the idea of an enacted world law was the natural outcome of its proceedings.

The upheavals resulting from World War I (1914–18) prompted a change in direction. From then on, European interest began to extend beyond the continental systems themselves, first, to those of the common-law countries (chiefly England and the United States), then still further afield to the Socialist systems, and finally, after 1945, to the laws of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. The new territory for legal study that has thus been opened up has resulted in references to comparative law, rather than to comparative legislation.

The world contains a vast number of national legal systems. The United Nations brings together representatives of some 127 states, but these states are far outnumbered by legal networks, since not all states—notably federal ones—have accomplished unification within their own frontiers. It is thus an enormous task to try to compare the laws of all the different jurisdictions. This problem, however, should not be overly magnified. Differences between the diverse systems are not always of the same order; some are sharp; others are so closely similar that a specialist in one branch of a legal “family” often may easily extend his studies to another branch of that family. For this reason, one can distinguish two types of research in comparative law. The exponent of “microcomparison” analyzes the laws belonging to the same legal family. By observing their differences, he will decide whether they are justified and whether an innovation made in one country would have value if introduced elsewhere. The researcher pledged to “macrocomparison,” on the other hand, investigates those systems differing most widely from each other in order to gain insight into institutions and thought processes that are foreign to him. For the “pure jurist,” concerned mainly with legal technicalities, microcomparison holds the greater attraction; whereas macrocomparison is the realm of the political scientist or legal philosopher, who sees law as a social science and is interested in its role in government and the organization of the community.

Microcomparison demands no particular preparation. The specialist in one national system is usually qualified to study those of various other countries of the same general family. His chief need is access to bibliographical material. In the United States, each state has its own statutes and, to some purposes, its own common law. Thus, the American lawyer must be a microcomparatist as he takes the 50 state systems and the federal law into daily account in his practice of the law. The same is true, to a large extent, of the Australian, or Indian, or Kenyan lawyer, who must take into account not only his own national system but also the laws of England and of other common-law jurisdictions in the Commonwealth. Whatever can be said of the common-law systems holds largely true for the Roman-law and Socialist families. French comparative law students encounter little difficulty in contrasting the laws of certain countries, so long as they confine their study to French, German, Italian, and Dutch law, which are related in tradition and structure and serve a similar type of society.

The situation differs greatly in consideration of macrocomparison. Here no comparison is possible without previously identifying and thoroughly mastering the fundamentals of the law systems as they differ from place to place. The jurist must, as it were, forget his training and begin to reason according to new criteria. If he is French, English, or American, he must recognize that in some folk societies of the Far East, the upright citizen never crosses the threshold of a courtroom and acknowledges no subjective rights; instead, the citizen's behaviour is governed by rites handed down from his ancestors, ensuring him the approval of the community. Likewise, if the Western jurist is to understand the law of the Muslim or Hindu, he must realize that the law is contained in rules of conduct laid down by a religion for its followers, and for its followers only. These rules, creating obligations and not rights, rank above all worldly matters and, in particular, are not to be confused with the regulations that a national government may, at a given time, enact and ratify. Further, in comparing his system of law with that of a Communist nation, the Westerner must remember that on no account does the citizen of a Marxist-Leninist state regard the rule of law as an ideal for society. Far from it, for his dream is to see law—which to him is synonymous with injustice and coercion—wither away in an affluent society founded on human solidarity and fellowship. A considerable shifting of legal gears is necessary before a French or German jurist can grasp the vital importance that the English or American lawyer traditionally attaches to the concept of due process and the rules of evidence; in continental eyes, procedural rules take second place to substantive law.

The specialist of macrocomparison also picks out the structural differences existing between certain systems. Accordingly, the Anglo-American lawyer must be aware of the importance of the distinction between public and private law—between law involving the state and law involving only individuals. The jurist in a Roman-law country must, conversely, appreciate the significance of the concepts of common law (unwritten customary law of various kinds) and equity (the use of injunctions and other equitable remedies), neither of which have counterparts in his own system. The lawyer from a centralized country must familiarize himself with the distinction between federal law and the laws of secondary jurisdictions (states, provinces, cantons, and so forth)—a distinction that is of fundamental importance in many countries. If he is from a nation like England or France that acknowledges the sovereignty of the national parliament, he must give due weight to the prominence of constitutional law in countries that permit courts to review the constitutional validity of legislative acts—especially in countries such as the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The jurist in a “bourgeois” country must appreciate the policy of collective ownership of means of production in Socialist states.

The terms microcomparison and macrocomparison, reflecting the language of economics, are in keeping with the idea that legal systems can be grouped into families, such as common-law, Roman, and Socialist. But it must be acknowledged that the number of identifiable families and the appropriate classification of a given system are questions always open to argument. The legal system of a given country, for instance, may exhibit some features that relate it to a particular family and others that may escape that classification. Such blurring of distinctions is particularly true of law in countries of Africa and the Middle East, where certain sectors of the law have been transformed by Western ideas (as in criminal and mercantile law and procedure) leaving other sectors (such as personal status, family law, and land law) faithful to traditional principles of the region. The phenomenon is not peculiar to those countries, however.

Wide differences also may be detected between legal systems that are commonly regarded as belonging to the same family. American law, for instance, without hesitation is ranked as a member of the common-law family; yet countless differences set it apart from English law, in large part because the United States has a federal and England a unitary system of government.

First of all, there has been a tendency to view comparative law from the standpoint of its value to the historical study of legal decision making—a consideration that was responsible for establishing the first chairs of comparative law in 19th-century Europe. Ideas regarding the place of law in society and the nature of the law itself—whether divine or secular, whether dealing with substantive or procedural rules—obviously become appreciably clearer when comparative law is joined to historical research. Indeed, to some extent historical background may aid in forecasting the future of certain national systems

A closely related consideration prompts many Western jurists, political scientists, and sociologists to acquaint themselves with non-Western methods of reasoning. Comparative studies reveal that the citizen of some countries of Asia and Africa looks upon the concept of a just social order with thoughts and feelings far removed from those of Western man. The notions of a rule of law and of rights of the individual—fundamental to Western civilization—are not wholly recognized by those societies that, faithful to the principle of conciliation and concerned primarily with harmony within the group, do not favour excessive Western-style individualism or the modern Western ideal of legal supremacy. Thus comparative law may enable statesmen, diplomats, and jurists to understand foreign points of view, and it may frequently help to create better international understanding.

Comparative law may be used for essentially practical ends. The businessman (business law), for instance, needs to know what benefits he may expect, what risks he may run, and generally how he should act if he intends to invest capital or make contracts abroad. It was with this purpose in mind that the first French institute of comparative law was set up in Lyon in 1920; its mission was to instruct French legal advisers on foreign trade. It was this practical aspect that also encouraged the growth of comparative law in the United States, where the essential aim of the law school has been usually to turn out practitioners; and one need hardly mention the strong link in Germany between big industry and the various institutes of comparative law. Sometimes it is said that studies with such a focus should not be considered a part of comparative law, but practical considerations certainly have helped to finance and promote the development of comparative legal studies in general.

The improvement of national legislation was the prime consideration during the 19th century in countries that were codifying or recodifying their legal systems. Numerous later additions to the Code Napoléon (Napoleonic Code), drawn up in 1804, for instance, were of foreign origin. Many other nations, of course, followed France's lead and introduced into their own systems elements of the French Napoleonic codes and institutions of French public law. It is well worth noticing that a book on French administrative laws was published in German by Otto Mayer before Mayer felt himself able to write a textbook on German administrative law.

The foreign inspiration of a number of legal rules or institutions is a well-known phenomenon, sometimes so all-embracing that one speaks of “reception”—reception, for instance, of the English common law in the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and Nigeria; reception of French law in French-speaking Africa, Madagascar, Egypt, and Indochina; reception of Swiss law in Turkey; and reception of both German and French law in Japan, along with even some reception of American common law. The study of comparative law has found a special place in countries where such a reception has occurred.

In modern times the spirit of nationalism has often tended to frustrate the development of an international law that would overcome individual national differences. One task facing statesmen and jurists is to inject new life into this effort, adapting it to the exigencies of the modern world. Those engaging in international trade, for instance, do not know with certainty which national law will regulate their agreements, since the answer depends to a large extent on a generally undecided factor—namely, which national court will be called upon to decide the questions of competence. Thus, the sole lasting remedy would seem to be the development of an international law capable of governing all legal questions outside the jurisdiction of a single state. Such a project can succeed only through the medium of comparative law.